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I.

SUMMARY OF THIS RESPONSE

This Supreme Court proceeding is the appellate review of a
February 2010 Final Judgment. That judgment declared the State’s prior
funding formulas violated Article IX, section 1 of our State constitution.
It was based on a 2009 trial with 55 witnesses and 566 exhibits.1
The State now asks this Court to do two things:
One- terminate this appellate review of the 2010 Final Judgment
declaring
the
State’s
prior
funding
formulas
unconstitutional,2 and
Two- make a factual finding declaring the State’s new funding
formulas fully comply with Article IX, section 1.3
This is plaintiffs’ response.

1

RP 1-5659 and CP 2866-2971 (all witnesses & exhibits listed at CP 2946-2971).
E.g., State Of Washington’s Memorandum Transmitting The Legislature’s 2018
Post-Budget Report (“State’s 2018 Brief”) at 2 (“The Court should...terminate review”),
at 6 (“The Court should...terminate review”), at 3 (Issue #3: “Should the court
relinquish its retained jurisdiction and terminate review?”), at 17 (“The Court should
relinquish jurisdiction over this appeal and terminate review”), & at 18 (“the Court
should relinquish its retained jurisdiction and terminate review”).
3
See, e.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 2 (“the Court should hold the State has achieved full
compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington constitution and with the Court’s
2012 McCleary decision”), at 2 (Issue #1: “Is the State now in full compliance with
article IX, section 1 of the Washington constitution?”), at 6 (“The Court should find that
the State is in full compliance with article IX, section 1 and the 2012 McCleary
decision”), at 8 (the November 2017 Order held the State is fully funding its new
formulas for transportation, etc.), at 16 (“The State is now in full compliance with
article IX, section 1 and this Court’s 2012 decision”), & at 17 (“The Court should hold
that the State has achieved full compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington
constitution and with the Court’s 2012 McCleary decision”).
2
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One (the past). At this point:
 The 2010 Final Judgment’s legal rulings on the meaning of
Article IX, section 1 have been affirmed.
 The 2010 Final Judgment’s factual determination that the
State’s prior funding formulas violated Article IX, section 1 has
been affirmed.
 The 2018 legislature passed legislation addressing this Court’s
remedial order (i.e., fund the State’s new formulas by
September 1, 2018).
 The 2018 legislature passed legislation addressing this Court’s
daily sanctions order (i.e., $100,000 immediately payable every
day beginning on August 13, 2015).
As for what is now in the past, the Final Judgment’s legal and
factual rulings have been affirmed and put to bed. And the State has now
enacted legislation addressing this Court’s remedial and sanctions orders.
Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that continuing this appellate review from
the underlying 2010 Final Judgment is no longer absolutely necessary.
They recognize that termination of this appellate review will allow the
State’s new funding formulas to operate this upcoming school year
without post-budget filings in this Court next year.

Indeed, that’s

consistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order, which noted the
State’s new program can operate with school district experience being the

-253013253.11

judge of whether the State’s new program funding proves adequate to
comply with the ample funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.4
Two (the future). At this point:
 The State will be funding its new formulas by September 1,
2018.
 The State alleges its new formulas amply fund all ten
components of the State’s basic education program.
 Plaintiffs assert the new formulas do not provide ample funding.
 But the evidentiary record in this case contains no sworn
testimony or trial court evidence addressing whether the new
formulas do or do not amply fund all ten components of the
State’s basic education program.
As for the future, the State’s new formulas do increase State
funding. But since those new formulas did not exist during this suit’s trial,
this suit’s appellate record does not have trial evidence proving whether or
not that increase is constitutionally adequate to comply with the ample
funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.
The appellate record in this case accordingly provides no
evidentiary basis for this Court to rule at this point that the State’s new
funding formulas do in fact amply fund the State’s basic education
program in full compliance with Article IX, section 1. Indeed, such a
declaration would be inconsistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order,
4

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
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which held that school district experience (rather than this McCleary
proceeding) will be the judge of whether the State’s new funding formulas
do in fact amply fund the State’s basic education program in full
compliance with Article IX, section 1.5

II.
A.

ADDRESSING THE PAST:
THE STATE’S PRIOR FUNDING FORMULAS

Further Review Is Not Needed To Confirm The Trial Court’s
Legal Rulings (the meaning of Article IX, section 1)
This Court’s January 2012 decision unanimously affirmed the legal

rulings in the February 2010 Final Judgment.6 It unequivocally cemented
the legal meaning of Article IX, section 1:


“Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.”7



This right to an amply funded education is each Washington
child’s paramount right under our State Constitution.8

5

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
6
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 514-529 (majority, per Stephens, J.) and at 547
(concurrence/dissent per Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with Justice Stephens’ articulation of
the State’s duty to fund education under article IX, section 1 of the Washington
Constitution”).
7
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483 (underline added); accord, August 2015 McCleary
Order at 2 (“In McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520, we held that the State’s ‘paramount duty’
under article IX, section 1...not only obligates the State to act in amply providing for
public education, it also confers upon the children of the state the right to be amply
provided with an education. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 513”) (underline
added); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2903, ¶148 (quoting that Seattle School District
ruling).
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Unlike rights framed in the negative to restrict government
action, this is a positive constitutional right that requires
government action.9



“all children” means every Washington child has this right:
“each and every child”; “No child is excluded.”10



“paramount duty” means “the State must amply provide for
the education of all Washington children as the State’s first
and highest priority before any other State programs or
operations.”11

8

Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 510-513; McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 514-522;
McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2903, ¶¶147-149.
9
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 518-519.
10
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (underlines added); 2010 McCleary Final Judgment at
CP 2908, ¶168 (“the word ‘all’ in Article IX, §1 means what it says.... It encompasses
each and every child since each will be a member of, and participant in, this State’s
democracy, society, and economy. Article IX, §1 accordingly requires the Respondent
State to amply provide for the education of every child residing in our State – not just
those children who enjoy the advantage of being born into one of the subsets of our
State’s children who are more privileged, more politically popular, or more easy to
teach.”); more background at Plaintiffs’ September 2010 Brief With Errata at 32-35.
11
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (underline added); August 2015 McCleary Order at 2
(“In McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520, we held that the State’s ‘paramount duty’ under
article IX, section 1 is of first and highest priority, requiring fulfillment before any other
State program or operation”); 2010 McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2906, ¶159
(“ ‘Paramount’ is not a mere synonym of ‘important.’ Rather, it means superior in rank
above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme, and in fact dominant.... When a thing is said
to be paramount, it can only mean that it is more important than all other things
concerned.”) (quoting Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wn.2d at 511) (underlines
added); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2906, ¶160 (reiterating this constitutional
mandate’s application: “During the trial, the State cross-examined many of the
Petitioners’ education witnesses as to whether they would prioritize education at the
expense of other worthy causes and services, such as health care, nutrition services, and
transportation needs. But this is not the prerogative of these witnesses – or even of the
Legislature – that decision has been mandated by our State Constitution.”); see also,
sworn trial testimony of the Director of the State’s Office of Financial Management
(OFM) at RP 3561:2-15 (testifying that K-12 funding must come first before State
programs for other matters such as public safety, human services, and health care).
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“ample” funding means “considerably more than just
adequate or merely sufficient.”12

In short: this Court has already affirmed the legal meaning of Article IX,
section 1. Further review is not needed to affirm it again.13
12

McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 528 (“ample” in Article IX, section 1 means “considerably
more than just adequate or merely sufficient”) & 484 (“ample” in Article IX, section 1
means “fully sufficient, and considerably more than just adequate”); McCleary Final
Judgment at CP 2907, ¶¶162-164 (quoting same dictionary this Court used in its 1978
Seattle School District decision (“AMPLE always means considerably more than
adequate or sufficient”), and reiterating that “Consistent with this meaning, the
Washington Supreme Court has held that Article IX, §1 requires the Respondent State to
provide ‘fully sufficient funds’ and a ‘level of funding that is fully sufficient’ to provide
for the education of all Washington children. Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wn.2d
at 518, 537.”).
13
Although the State asserts in a footnote that this Court “rejected plaintiffs’ attempt
to import capital costs into article IX, section 1” [State’s 2018 Brief at 8 n.2], plaintiffs
never claimed the 2010 Final Judgment on appeal in this proceeding held that full or sole
State funding of all capital costs is required by Article IX, section 1, or that the State’s
prototypical school allocation model for operating costs incorporated capital
construction costs too. Instead, (1) plaintiffs accurately noted this Court had cautioned
the State to account for how districts could secure the capital funds needed to achieve the
full-day kindergarten and K-3 class sizes set by the State, and (2) the State then assured
this Court that the State had done so.
As to the first point, see, e.g., January 2014 McCleary Order at 5 (noting OSPI’s
estimate that school districts will need about $704 million to build the classrooms
required to expand kindergarten to full-day and reduce K-3 class sizes to 17, and holding
“the State must account for the actual cost to schools of providing these components of
basic education”) and at 7 (reiterating that State funding at that time did “not account
for the additional capital investment needed to implement full-day kindergarten”);
August 2015 McCleary Order at 3 (noting “the need for adequate capital expenditures to
ensure implementation of all-day kindergarten and early elementary class size
reductions”) and at 6 (“as to both class size reductions and all-day kindergarten, it is
unclear, and the State does not expressly say, whether the general budget or the capital
budget makes sufficient capital outlays to ensure that classrooms will be available for full
implementation of all-day kindergarten and reduced class sizes.... The State has
provided no plan for how it intends to pay for the facilities needed for all-day
kindergarten and reduced class sizes. As the court emphasized in its January 2014 order,
the State needs to account for the actual cost to schools of providing all-day kindergarten
and smaller K-3 class sizes.”); October 2016 McCleary Order at 2-3 (noting “the need
for adequate capital expenditures to ensure implementation of all-day kindergarten and
early elementary class size reductions.”)
As to the second point, see the State’s oral argument before this Court’s
November 2017 Order, telling this Court how the State was providing large amounts of
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B.

Further Review Is Not Needed To Confirm The Trial Court’s
Factual Findings (the State’s prior funding formulas violated
Article IX, section 1)
This Court’s January 2012 decision unanimously affirmed the

factual declarations in the February 2010 Final Judgment. 14 For example,
under the State’s prior funding formulas:


“State funding is not ample”.15



The State “is not amply providing for the equipping of all
children residing in this State with the basic knowledge and
skills included within the substantive ‘education’ mandated by
Article IX, §1.”16



“The State’s provisions for education do not provide all children
residing in our State with a realistic or effective opportunity to
become equipped with that knowledge, skill, or substantive
‘education’”.17

As this Court therefore succinctly declared when affirming the 2010 Final
Judgment in this appeal: “The State has failed to meet its duty under
article IX, section 1 by consistently providing school districts with a level

school construction funding, and saying the State was not aware of any full-day
kindergarten or K-3 class size reductions being prevented by lack of classroom space.
[available at https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2017101066 , timestamp 18:55-20:50.]
14
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529-530 (majority, per Stephens, J.) and at 547
(concurrence/dissent per Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with ... the conclusion that the current
system is not operating at its constitutionally mandated levels”).
15
McCleary Final Judgment at ¶IV Conclusion (CP 2945).
16
McCleary Final Judgment at ¶231 (CP 2929) (“The Respondent State is not amply
providing for the equipping of all children residing in this State with the basic knowledge
and skills mandated by this State's minimum education standards. The Respondent State
is not amply providing for the equipping of all children residing in this State with the
basic knowledge and skills included within the substantive ‘education’ mandated by
Article IX, §1”).
17
McCleary Final Judgment at ¶231(a) (CP 2929).
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of resources that falls short of the actual costs of the basic education
program.”18
In short: this Court has already affirmed the trial court’s factual
findings and determination that the State’s funding formulas at the time of
trial violated Article IX, section 1. Further review is not needed to affirm
the Final Judgment’s factual findings about the State’s prior funding.

C.

Further Review Is Not Needed To Implement This Court’s
Remedial Orders (fully fund all the State’s new formulas by
September 1, 2018)
This Court’s remedial orders required the State to fully fund all the

new formulas the State said it was working on by no later than
September 1, 2018.19 This Court’s recent November 2017 Order noted the

18

McCleary, 173 Wn2d at 547.
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 484 (noting Court was deferring to “the State’s plan to
fully implement the reforms by 2018”) & 508 (reiterating Court’s 2018 deadline was
based on fact “the legislature declared its intent to implement the details of ESHB 2261
through a phased-in approach as recommended by the QEC, with full implementation by
2018. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 548, §114(5)(b)(iii).”); December 2012 McCleary Order at 2
(2018 is a “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance”) (underlines added);
October 2016 McCleary Order at 12-13 (“Any program for full state funding of basic
education must therefore be fully implemented not later than September 1, 2018. ...[T]he
legislature committed itself to enacting a fully complying program by the end of the 2017
session. This court has never purported to alter the compliance deadline. We conclude,
based on the relevant legislation, that the State has until September 1, 2018, to fully
implement its program of basic education, and that the remaining details of that
program, including funding sources and the necessary appropriations for the 2017-19
biennium, are to be in place by final adjournment of the 2017 legislative session.”).
19
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State met this deadline with one exception: the State fell about $1 billion
short in funding its new salary formula by September 1, 2018.20
The State says its 2018 legislature provided that missing salary
funding through two enactments adding $969.8 million by the
September 1, 2018 start of 2018-2019 school year.21
Plaintiffs want to be clear: they do not believe the State’s new
funding formulas provide ample State funding for the education of all
Washington children as Article IX, section 1 requires.
But the State has now at least provided for the funding of its new
formulas by the September 1, 2018 deadline set by this Court’s remedial
orders. Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that continuing this proceeding’s
appellate review is no longer needed to ensure the State funds its new
formulas by the remedial orders’ September 1, 2018 deadline.22

20

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 41 (concluding: “by all relevant estimates, it
appears EHB 2242 and the 2017-19 budget fall short by about a billion dollars in fully
funding the salary increases by the 2018-19 school year”) & 2 (“Until the State enacts
measures that fully implement its program of basic education by the September 1, 2018
deadline, it remains out of compliance”).
21
State’s 2018 Brief at 9-11 (asserting that ESSB 6030 [supplemental operating
budget] added $775.8 million in the 2018-2019 fiscal year for the first ten months of the
2018-2019 school year, and E2SSB 6362 (McCleary bill) committed the State to adding
$194.0 million in the 2019-2020 fiscal year for the last two months of the 2018-2019
school year); accord Legislature’s 2018 Report at 12-13. Plaintiffs will trust that the
State’s representation to this Court that it will appropriate that $194 million is true.
22
Supra, footnote 21.
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D.

Further Review Is Not Needed To Determine The Monetary
Sanction Amount Still Owed On July 1, 2018
($18,209,687.67)
This Court’s sanctions order imposed a liquidated $100,000 legal

obligation on the State every single day starting on August 13, 2015.23
Since there are 1052 days from that date to the July 1, 2018 date the
supplemental budget takes effect, and since 1052 times $100,000 equals
$105.2 million, the State says it will fully pay the accrued sanction when
its supplemental budget places $105.2 million in a Dedicated McCleary
Penalty Account.24
But each day’s $100,000 sanction was a liquidated obligation
“effective immediately” and “payable daily”.25 Thus, as previous briefing
has noted – and the State has never disputed – each day’s $100,000
obligation accrued prejudgment interest at the statutory 12% rate until
23

The August 13, 2015 sanctions order imposed a daily penalty in the liquidated sum
of $100,000 per day “effective immediately”, and “payable daily to be held in a
segregated account”. August 13, 2015 McCleary Order at 9-10; October 6, 2016
McCleary Order at 13 (the payable-daily penalty shall continue to accrue); and as
background, September 11, 2014 McCleary Order (ruling the State in contempt of court).
24
See, e.g., Legislature’s 2018 Report at 23 (the $105.2 million placed in the
Dedicated McCleary Penalty Account “represents the accrued penalty from August 13,
2015...through June 30, 2018”); State’s 2018 Brief at 1-2 (the funds deposited into that
account fully pay the sanction accruing from August 13, 2015 through June 30, 2018),
at 2 (“the Court should find that the State has...paid the sanction”); at 2 (Issue #2: did
the 2018 legislature deposit into the penalty account “funds sufficient to pay the accrued
contempt sanction”), at 6 (the Court should find that “the 2018 legislature [did]...fully
pay the contempt sanction that has accrued since August 2015”), at 14 (asserting the
2018 legislature fully paid the contempt sanction accrued from August 13, 2015 through
June 30, 2018 with $105.2 million), at 15 (“The Court should...find that the State has
fully paid the sanction”), & at 17 (“The Court should find that the State has fully paid the
accrued contempt sanction”).
25
Supra, footnote 23.
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paid.26 Running a basic summation equation for that accruing interest
over the 1052 days of $100,000 sanctions yields an accrued interest total
of $18,209,687.67.27
This $18 million shortfall might seem akin to a “rounding error” to
government officials in charge of an over $40 billion biennium State
budget. But $18 million is not trivial to a struggling middle school student
excluded from the State’s most recent LAP funding increase because his
school has “only” a 49% poverty rate.

Or a non-English speaking

elementary school student excluded from the State’s most recent TBIP
funding increase because she hasn’t made it to high school yet. Or a
troubled high school student left without timely counseling under the
State’s partial-FTE funding of school mental health counselors. Or a
disabled student in a school district whose disabled student population
exceeds the 13.5% cap on the State’s special education funding.
In short: the supplemental budget that commences on July 1, 2018
fails to fund $18,209,687.67 of the monetary sanction accrued through
26

Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at 29 & 45. Accord, e.g., Rekhter v. Washington
Department of Social & Health Services [“DSHS”], 180 Wn.2d 102, 124, 323 P.3d 1036
(2014) (“Prejudgment interest is available...when an amount claimed is ‘liquidated’ ”);
Pierce County v. State, 144 Wn.App. 783, 855, 185 P.3d 594 (2008) (trial court abused
its discretion by denying prejudgment interest on liquidated damages owed by State);
State v. Sims, 1 Wn.App.2d 472, 476, 406 P.3d 649 (2017) (affirming interest on
monetary sanctions imposed against the Washington Department of Social and Health
Services [“DSHS”]).
27
The State surely knows this accrued interest number since it has previously assured
this Court that its Treasurer’s Office was keeping account of the accruing amount owed.
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June 30, 2018. But this Court does not need to continue this appellate
review to rule right now that this liquidated $18,209,687.67 amount is
(and will be every day after June 30, 2018 still be) due and owing under
this Court’s August 13, 2015 sanctions order.
E.

Conclusion Regarding What’s Now In The Past
(the State’s prior funding formulas and the trial court’s
corresponding Final Judgment)
The Final Judgment’s legal rulings have been affirmed. Its factual

findings regarding the State’s prior funding formulas have been affirmed.
The State has now enacted legislation addressing this Court’s remedial
order requiring the State to fully fund new formulas by September 1, 2018.
And determining the $18,209,687.67 sanctions amount left unfunded does
not require a continuation of this appellate proceeding.
Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that this Court’s appellate review
of the trial court’s 2010 Final Judgment on the State’s prior funding
formulas can at this point finally end – thereby allowing the State’s new
basic education program formulas to operate this upcoming school year
without any post-budget filings in this McCleary case next year. In short:
allow the State’s new program to operate, with school district experience
being the judge of whether the State’s new funding levels prove adequate
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to comply with Article IX, section 1’s ample funding mandate for the
education of all Washington children.28

III.
A.

ADDRESSING THE FUTURE:
THE STATE’S NEW FUNDING FORMULAS

Context Motivating The Factual Finding Now Requested By
The State
This year, the State submitted its seventh post-budget filing in this

McCleary proceeding.

After all those annual reports, plaintiffs can

understand how elected officials have grown weary with what some call
“McCleary fatigue”.
These past few years, the State has worked hard to increase State
school funding by billions of dollars in response to this Court’s
January 2012 McCleary decision.29

After all that work, plaintiffs can

understand that elected officials don’t want to hear any more complaints

28

Cf. November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
29
The State notes it has added billions of dollars to State school funding from the
2011-2012 fiscal year to the 2018-2019 fiscal year. E.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 16 (noting
the State added billions of dollars between the 2011-2012 fiscal year and the 2018-2019
fiscal year); similarly Legislature’s 2018 Report at 6-10 & 25, see also at 18-22 (various
categorical increases). Plaintiffs do not digress into addressing the State’s self-serving
characterizations of its increases [e.g., Legislature’s 2018 Report at 3 (“substantial
increases”) and at 4 (“unprecedented increases”)] because the misleading nature of
such generalized characterizations have been previously addressed in prior post-budget
filings. E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 10-15 & 17-18.
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about the State violating the paramount duty, ample funding, and
all children requirements of Article IX, section 1.
Plaintiffs can therefore understand why the State would like this
Court to now block complaints about the State’s new funding levels.
Hence the State’s request to gag and bury such complaints by issuing a
preemptive factual finding that the State’s new funding levels have been
proven to in fact comply with the paramount duty, ample funding, and
all children requirements of Article IX, section 1.30
The following pages explain why plaintiffs object.
B.

No Trial Has Proven The Factual Finding The State Now
Requests
There has been no trial on the question of whether the State’s new

funding levels for its revised basic education program comply with the
paramount duty,

ample funding,

and

all children

requirements

of

Article IX, section 1.
The State accordingly cited no witness examination or cross under
oath on that compliance question. It cited no court-admitted exhibits on
that question. It cited no evidence in the appellate record proving the fact
it wants this Court to now declare – i.e., that the State’s new funding levels
comply with Article IX, section 1.

30

Supra, footnote 3.
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In short: the State’s demand that this Court issue a factual finding
declaring that the State’s new funding levels comply with Article IX,
section 1 lacks evidentiary proof. Plaintiffs accordingly object.
C.

The State’s Now Attempting To Shut The Courthouse Door
That It Previously Proclaimed Would Always Be Open
Plaintiffs’ prior post-budget filings pointed out various ways in

which the State’s new funding formulas fell short. The State objected that
this Court cannot rule on the State’s new funding and formulas because
this suit’s appellate record does not address them – and insisted “the
courthouse door will be open to plaintiffs” who want to claim in another
suit that the State’s new funding does not comply with Article IX,
section 1.31
Plaintiffs object to the State’s new demand that this Court now
issue a factual finding declaring that the State’s new funding levels
comply with Article IX, section 1 because, frankly, the State will then cite
that declaration to shut the courthouse door that the State previously
insisted would always be open to plaintiffs who claim those new funding
levels do not comply.

31

State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 33.
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D.

This Court’s November 2017 Order Did Not Make The Factual
Finding That The State’s 2018 Post-Budget Filing Requests
The State asks this Court to declare that its November 2017 Order

made a factual finding that the dollar funding levels provided by the
State’s new formulas do in fact achieve full compliance with Article IX,
section 1’s ample funding mandate.32
But this Court’s November 2017 Order did not make that factual
finding. Instead, as the State’s 2018 court filing acknowledges, this Court
simply deferred at this point to the legislative branch’s assurances, and
thus deemed at this point that the State’s new program funding formulas
satisfied a “reasonably likely to achieve standard” since they fell within
the legislature’s range of discretion.33

32

Supra, footnote 3.
Legislature’s 2018 Report at 2 (this Court’s November 2017 Order was based on its
“deeming that the education policies and funding levels in that legislation [EHB 2242]
fell within the range of discretion granted to the legislature under Article IX’s paramount
duty”) (citing November 2017 Order at 37). The State’s claim that its supplemental
budget “completed the final legislative step identified by this Court as necessary to
achieve full compliance with Article IX” (Legislature’s 2018 Report at 24) accordingly
misses the point of this Court’s November 2017 Order – for it did not make the factual
finding of full compliance the State now requests. To the contrary, the November 2017
Order expressly declared that school districts’ upcoming experience with the State’s new
funding formulas – not this McCleary proceeding – would be the judge of whether the
new formulas in fact provide the ample funding for all children mandated by Article IX,
section 1. November 2017 Order at 37 (“The legislature’s actions as to these
components are not perfect, but the legislature has acted within the broad range of its
policy discretion in a manner that ‘achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve’ the
constitutional end of amply funding K-12 basic education. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519.
At this point, the court is willing to allow the State’s program to operate and let
experience be the judge of whether it proves adequate.”). [Plaintiffs also note that the
State’s suggestion that this Court has ruled on “Article IX” in general rather than just
the ample funding mandate of section 1 is erroneous – for as prior briefing (and the
33
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That’s not a remarkable conclusion since there is no evidence in
the trial court record about the new formulas adopted after trial. But that
conclusion is not a factual finding by this Court that the new funding
formulas adopted after trial do in fact provide the ample funding levels
Article IX, section 1 requires.
E.

The Factual Finding Requested By The State Contradicts This
Court’s November 2017 Order
The State has repeatedly alleged in this appellate proceeding that

its new formulas will amply fund the education of all Washington
children, and plaintiffs have repeatedly replied how the new formulas fall
short.
This Court’s November 2017 Order did not issue a final
determination on this factual dispute – an unremarkable result since the
trial court record in front of this Court did not address the State’s new
formulas.

This Court’s November 2017 Order accordingly declared

instead that, at this point, the Court is going to let actual school district
experience be the judge of whether or not the State’s new basic education
program funding proves to be constitutionally adequate: “At this point,

State’s own statements to this Court) confirm, this has never been a section 2 uniformity
case.
E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 19-20 & n.68; Plaintiffs’
2016 Post-Budget Filing at 41 & n.85 (quoting State’s oral argument).]
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the court is willing to allow the State’s program to operate and let
experience be the judge of whether it proves adequate.”34
The State now demands that this Court do the opposite: charge
ahead and declare that the State’s new funding levels comply with
Article IX, section 1, without evidence of any school district’s actual
experience under those new formulas. Plaintiffs object because such a
declaration contradicts the November 2017 Order’s ruling that this Court
will let school district experience be the judge of whether or not the
State’s new funding levels comply with Article IX, section 1.

F.

The Judicial Declaration That’s Consistent With This Court’s
November 2017 Order
The following paragraphs explain the judicial declaration that’s

consistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order – namely, one which
leaves no doubt that school district experience with the State’s new basic
education program funding levels will determine if those new funding
levels comply with Article IX, section 1.
1.

The State’s Basic Education Program

This Court’s January 2012 ruling reiterated the following points
about the State’s basic education program:

34

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37.
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“Basic Education” means “the basic knowledge and skills
needed to compete in today’s economy and meaningfully
participate in this state’s democracy”35 – more specifically:
the knowledge and skills specified in the Seattle School
District ruling (90 Wn.2d at 517-518), the four numbered
provisions of ESHB 1209 (now RCW 28A.150.210), and the
State’s corresponding Essential Academic Learning
Requirements (EALRs).36



“Basic Education Program” means the program enacted by
the State’s legislative authority to provide every child a
realistic and effective opportunity to become equipped with the
knowledge and skills specified in the above “basic education”
definition.37

35

McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 524 n.21 (“For our purposes, the terms ‘education’ under
article IX, section 1 and ‘basic education’ are synonymous”), at 483 (“The word
‘education’ under article IX, section 1 means the basic knowledge and skills needed to
compete in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this state’s democracy”) &
at 521.
36
Supra, footnote 35; McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 523-524 (the legislature provided
specific substantive content to the word education by adopting the four numbered
provisions in ESHB 1209 and developing the EALRs; “Building on the educational
concepts outlined in Seattle School District, ESHB 1209 and the EALRs identified the
knowledge and skills specifically tailored to help students succeed as active citizens in
contemporary society. In short, these measures together define a ‘basic education’ – the
substance of the constitutionally required ‘education’ under article IX, section 1.”). This
Court’s 2012 ruling was not a surprise because it reiterated prior legal rulings in the
2010 McCleary Final Judgment and 1978 Seattle School District decision.
37
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 525 (quoting testimony of the Chair of the Joint
Task Force on Basic Education Finance (the foundation for ESHB 2261) that the State
must provide an opportunity that is realistic); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2910,
¶174 (quoting Seattle School District holding that “The effective teaching ... of these
essential skills make up the minimum of the education that is constitutionally required”);
McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2929, ¶231(a) (“When this ruling holds the State is not
making ample provision for the equipping of all children with the knowledge, skills, or
substantive ‘education’ discussed in this ruling, that holding also includes the court’s
determination that the State’s provisions for education do not provide all children
residing in our State with a realistic or effective opportunity to become equipped with
that knowledge, skill, or substantive ‘education’ ”).
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The ten components of the State’s basic education program
include:
(1)

To/from pupil transportation.38

(2)

Materials,
Supplies,
and
Operating
Costs
39
(“MSOCs”, formerly referred to as “NERCs”).

(3)

Full-Day Kindergarten.40

(4)

K-3 class sizes of 17 students per classroom.41

(5)

Special education for children with disabilities.42

(6)

Remediation for struggling students (Learning Assistance
Program or “LAP”).43

(7)

Transitional Bilingual Education for students whose
primary language is other than English (Transitional
Bilingual Instructional Program or “TBIP”, formerly
referred to as English Language Learners or
“ELL”).44

(8)

Highly capable student instruction.45

(9)

24 credit hour high school graduation requirement
(Core 24).46

(10) Compensation sufficient to attract, recruit, and retain
competent teachers, administrators, and staff to
implement the State’s basic education program.47
38

See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget
Filing at 3.
39
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 497-499, 506, 509 n.17, 510, 533-535; cf. State’s
2017 Post-Budget Filing at 5.
40
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506, 510, 526 n.22; cf. State’s
2017 Post-Budget Filing at 4.
41
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 510, 545; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 5.
42
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget
Filing at 4.
43
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget
Filing at 4.
44
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget
Filing at 4.
45
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506, 526 n.22; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget
Filing at 3.
46
See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing
at 3-4.
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2.

The Current Factual Dispute About Ample Funding

As noted earlier, the State has now replaced the prior funding
formulas found to be unconstitutionally low at trial with new funding
formulas that increase State funding levels.
There is a factual dispute about the ampleness of the funding levels
provided by these new formulas. The State alleges its new formulas will
amply fund the education of all Washington children. Plaintiffs have
repeatedly replied how the new formulas fall short. But there is no trial
court evidence to prove who, as a matter of fact, is correct about the
State’s new funding formulas.
3.

Appellate Courts Are Not Trial Courts

Plaintiffs recognize that a Supreme Court is not a trial court. It
does not conduct trials. It does not observe witness examination and
cross. It does not handle the admission of trial exhibits. It instead reviews
the cold written trial court record of the proceedings below. And here, the
trial court record below does not address the State’s new program funding.
The State accordingly did not (because it could not) cite evidence
or proof in the trial court record for the factual finding the State now asks

47

See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 497, 507, 536; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing
at 4; Legislature’s 2017 Report at 19 (EHB 2242 acknowledges that funding sufficient to
hire and retain qualified staff is an element of the State’s basic education program);
accord, e.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 7 (“salary allocations necessary to hire and retain
qualified staff” are a component of the State’s basic education program).
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this appellate court to make – i.e., a factual finding that declares the
State’s new basic education program funding levels do in fact comply with
the previously noted ample funding for all children mandate of Article IX,
section 1.
This lack of evidence or proof in the record before this Court is
also why this Court’s November 2017 Order declared that actual school
district experience under the State’s new funding formulas (rather than this
McCleary Court) will be the judge of whether or not the State’s new
program funding proves to be constitutionally adequate.48
4.

Appellate Courts Set The Law For The Future

Given the history noted above, the judicial declaration consistent
with this Court’s November 2017 Order is one that makes it clear that this
Court has not issued a factual finding on whether the State’s new basic
education program funding levels do or do not in fact comply with
Article IX, section 1. The judicial declaration consistent with this Court’s
November 2017 Order is one that reaffirms this Court’s November 2017
conclusion that school district experience (rather than this McCleary case)
will be the judge of whether or not the State’s new funding formulas will
prove to be constitutionally adequate to comply with Article IX, section 1.

48

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
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G.

Conclusion Regarding What Now Lies Ahead
(the State’s new funding formulas and whether they in fact provide
the ample funding required by Article IX, section 1)
The State has argued that its new program funding levels are

intended to provide its 295 public school districts the ample funding
mandated by Article IX, section 1, and alleged that its new program
funding levels are reasonably likely to do so. Plaintiffs have countered
with examples illustrating how the State’s new program funding levels
do not do that.
But this suit’s appellate record has no trial evidence to prove who
is in fact correct. The State’s demand that this Court nonetheless declare
that the State’s new program funding levels do in fact comply with
Article IX, section 1 is therefore a demand for judicial speculation.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that speculating is not a proper role
for this Court. Especially here, where the factual finding demanded by the
State preemptively shuts the courthouse door to a future plaintiff seeking
to prove the State’s new program funding levels violate Article IX,
section 1. Especially here, where the State itself has previously assured
this Court that the courthouse door would always be open for such a
plaintiff. And especially here, where this Court’s November 2017 Order
told our public school students that their schools’ upcoming experience
(rather than this McCleary appeal proceeding) will be the judge of whether
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the State’s new funding formulas do in fact amply fund the State’s basic
education program for those students in full compliance with Article IX,
section 1.49
This Court has reiterated in this case that its “constitutional
responsibility is to the schoolchildren of this state who have an
enforceable right under article IX, section 1 to an amply funded
education.”50

And it has emphasized that fulfilling the State’s

constitutional responsibility under Article IX, section 1 requires the
judicial branch to remain vigilant, because success in upholding
Washington children’s positive constitutional right to an amply funded
education depends on continued vigilance on the part of the courts.51
The State’s demand for a preemptive factual finding of full
constitutional compliance, in contrast, asks the judicial branch to close the
courthouse door, turn off the lights, and go to sleep.
Plaintiffs accordingly oppose the State’s demand for a preemptive
constitutional compliance declaration. The trial court record on appeal,
the State’s own “courthouse door will be open” assurance to this Court,
and the recent November 2017 Order, all confirm a fundamental point:

49

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
50
November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 2.
51
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 547.

- 24 53013253.11

the question of whether the State’s new funding levels do in fact comply
with the ample funding for all children mandate of Article IX, section 1 is
a question to be resolved another day in another case – not a question to be
gagged and buried here with a speculative factual finding of compliance
today.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs agree the State’s appeal of the trial court’s February 2010
Final Judgment could be terminated, because (1) this Court affirmed the
trial court’s legal ruling on the meaning of Article IX, section 1; (2) it
affirmed the trial court’s factual finding that the State’s prior funding
formulas violated Article IX, section 1; (3) the State has addressed this
Court’s remedial order by providing for the funding of the State’s new
formulas by September 1, 2018; and (4) calculating the interest amount
that accrued on the liquidated $100,000/day penalty requires math rather
than further Supreme Court proceedings.
Plaintiffs do not agree, however, that this Court should immunize
the State’s new funding formulas from Article IX, section 1 scrutiny by
issuing a preemptive factual finding that the State’s new program funding
levels do in fact comply with the ample funding for all children mandate
of Article IX, section 1.
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A factual finding about the State’s new program funding levels
requires proven facts about those new funding levels. But there are no
such facts in the appellate record of this suit’s 2009 trial.

Plaintiffs

accordingly acknowledge the logic of this Court’s November 2017 Order
holding that the State’s new program should at this point be allowed to
operate, with actual experience being the judge of whether its new funding
levels prove constitutionally adequate.52
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2018.
Foster Pepper PLLC
s/ Thomas F. Ahearne
.
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844
Christopher G. Emch, WSBA No. 26457
Adrian Urquhart Winder, WSBA No. 38071
Kelly A. Mennemeier, WSBA No. 51838
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents McCleary
Family, Venema Family, and Network for
Excellence in Washington Schools (NEWS)

52

November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves
adequate.”).
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